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20 May 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Intelligence)

SUBJECT : Reporting to the White House

REFERENCE : Your Memo for the Record, 14 May 1965

1. We have striven mightily over the years to conform to your points 1 and 2. The one exception which now exists to our knowledge is our delivery of finished output to Moyers at DCI's instruction. Cable Secretariat is also delivering [redacted] to Moyers, but is having a difficult time finding anyone in the White House willing to sign for them. (Our stuff at least goes to Moyers through the Situation Room, because of its classification, but what happens to it after that we have no idea.) Should any of this continue and, if so, how?

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2. A "greased channel" now exists, as far as we can tell, for the President's Brief and for our Dominican spot reports. It would be possible to extend the spot report system to cover the whole range of intelligence reporting. In this case, the President's Brief group would be responsible for selecting and writing spot reports, except when a task force is functioning. These would be worldwide, but would be based only on intelligence sources, i.e., no State or operational military traffic. This system would also be responsive to any instructions from the DCI. If Bundy wishes this, we can start it with no great strain.

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3. The raw [redacted] problem is something else again. At present, about 30 such reports a day are sent to the White House (the "EXO" dissemination). Primary selection is done by Cable Secretariat, which sends to EXO [redacted] which are sent to the DCI. A secondary selection is carried out by the DD/P division reports officers, who may recommend to FI Staff that a report be sent to EXO if they happen to be aware of a White House interest. The selected cables go to the White House by courier around the clock, and many go electrically. It is literally impossible to insert any DD/I evaluation into this process without slowing it down.

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4. We also do not believe it is feasible to eliminate the delivery of raw traffic to the White House. The White House already receives a much larger proportion of State's and DOD's raw traffic than it does of CIA's. Moreover, CIA's traffic is disseminated to everyone else. The trend of the times is for more raw disseminations, not less, and for passage direct from the field to the White House without intervening delays in Washington. Until the last few days, CIA had successfully resisted direct transmission, but in the Dominican affair we caved in, and [redacted] raw reports are now received in the White House at the same time they are received in Langley. Our spot reports are an attempt to cope with this.

5. We can see two ways to meet your requirements in this situation. The first is an extension of the spot report system we propose in Para 2. It would involve an agreement with Bundy and Brom Smith that they would consult with CCI if they believe the President should see a CS report. CCI would then either prepare an evaluated spot report or include the material in the President's Brief, depending on time factors. The selection and flow of raw reports would not be changed.

6. The second solution involves much more basic changes, but would have some desirable side effects. This would be to transfer from Cable Secretariat to Operations Center the basic responsibility for selecting intelligence cables for the DCI and for the President. The GDO could then decide whether to pass the report as is, or with comment, or as a spot report. At the same time, the full take of raw DD/P output could be delivered to Debevoise's shop for the White House Staff without smothering the Bundy-Smith complex and without denying "The White House" any CIA raw intelligence. The advantage in this system comes from our long-standing belief that the Operations Center can do a better job of selection for the DCI than can the Cable Secretariat, and that it is better to have this job done in one place than in two, as at present. Cable Secretariat now selects from CIA and State Cable traffic; Operations Center selects from everything else. We see the White House responsibility as a handle to get the DCI responsibility transferred. Under present White House conditions, keeping the DCI informed is probably the best service we can perform. Also, acceptance of this change would virtually force DD/P to create a senior duty officer of his own and put him in the Operations Center.

R. J. SMITH  
Assistant Director  
Current Intelligence

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: Reporting to White House

In a talk with DDCI today it was agreed:

1. Our principal target and only place of entry for intelligence reporting to "the White House" will be the NEC Staff (McGeorge Bundy, Bromley Smith, and the International Situation Room).
2. Papers or reports delivered to McGeorge Bundy for the President may be info to Valenti, Moyers, et al., but Bundy (as NEC Affairs Assistant) is the channel for intelligence for the President from CIA.
3. A "greased channel" through Bundy should be established for the President's Daily Brief and any other reports the DCI wishes to insure the President sees (DDI to establish and maintain).
4. The DDI and Chief, FI should coordinate carefully on policy governing the passage of CS reports to the White House so that, where appropriate, DDI evaluations could be promptly supplied to top-level readers of the raw intelligence--this procedure not, however, to slow down the dispatch of CS reports to consumers.

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RAY S. CLINE

Deputy Director for Intelligence

W/DBI: [REDACTED] (13 May 1965)

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